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Introduction
When government organizations spend public money, they want to make sure 
that contracts are only awarded to businesses that are trustworthy and repu-
table. Furthermore, to enhance fairness in competition it is important to create 
a level playing field, considering that non-compliance with legal rules can 
create an unfair advantage.1 Dishonest and/or corrupt companies should 
therefore, in the view of most governments, be excluded from public procure-
ment processes.
This idea can also be found in EU public procurement law. As has been the 
case in previous versions of the EU rules, the current public procurement 
directives govern the grounds for exclusion of economic operators.2 Under 
(1) Cf. Case C-226/04, La Cascina [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:94, opinion of AG Maduro.
(2) See in general: S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Vol. I (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), pp.  1184-1335; A.  Sanchez-Graells, “Exclusion, Qualitative 
Selection and Short-listing”, in F.  Lichère, R.  Caranta and S.  Treumer (eds),  Modernising 
Public Procurement. The New Directive, Vol. 6, European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen: 
DJØF, 2014), pp. 97-129; S. de Mars, Exclusion and Self-Cleaning in Article 57: Discretion at 
the Expense of Clarity and Trade? Paper for UACES 45th  Annual Conference, Bilbao, Spain, 
7-9 September 2015, 22 p.; L. Butler, “Selection, Qualification, and Exclusion of Tenderers in 
UK Public Procurement Law”, in M.  Trybus, R.  Caranta and S.  Treumer (eds) Selection, 
Qualification and Exclusion of Tenderers in EU Public Contract Law (Copenhagen: DJØF, 
2015); K. Colpaert and S. Van Garsse, Wegwijs in de klassieke overheidsopdrachten, (Brussels: 
Politeia, 2014) chapter 6; E. J. Hjelmeng and T. Søreide, “Debarment in Public Procurement: 
Rationales and Realization”, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, No. 2014-32, 16 p.
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stated conditions, businesses will not be allowed to bid for a contract. Some 
of the grounds for exclusion in the 2014 Public Sector Directive3 are manda-
tory, whereas other grounds for exclusion are discretionary. The approach of 
the Union legislature was historically and remains (largely) to adopt grounds 
for exclusion based on facts or conduct specific to the economic operator 
concerned, such as conduct that discredits its professional reputation or calls 
into question its economic or financial ability to complete the works covered 
by the public contract for which he is tendering.4 The stated exclusions 
grounds are consequently a finite list, rooted in factual findings of undesirable 
practices on the part of the economic operator.
In this contribution the regime of the 2014 Public Sector Directive on exclu-
sion grounds will be set out, and its novelties (including self-cleaning) will be 
explained.5 The article will proceed as follows. The first section examines 
mandatory exclusions. The second section discusses discretionary/optional 
exclusion grounds. A third part elaborates on changes made in the 2014 
Directive as a response to Court of Justice case law or a lack of clarity in the 
2004 Public Sector Directive.6 The fourth part considers the newly introduced 
principle of self-cleaning. The article will then, in a fifth part, address the 
duration of the exclusions permitted and/or required by the 2014 Directive. 
The article finally summarizes the setup of the 2014 Public Sector Directive’s 
exclusion regime in a brief conclusion.
(3) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65.
(4) See Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos 
Epikrateias [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:731, para 42 and compare S.  Arrowsmith above (n  2) 
1266: some of the new exclusion grounds are different. “These provisions appear to be concerned 
with exclusions from the procurement because of the need to ensure the proper procurement of 
that procurement, rather than with conduct giving rise to possible exclusions in general.”
(5) See for similar grounds: Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26  February 2014 on the award of concession contracts and Directive 2014/25/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26  February 2014 on procurement by entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L94/243; for other commentary, see H. Priess, “The rules on exclusion 
and self-cleaning under the 2014 Public Procurement Directive” (2014) 23 PPLR 112; 
A. Sanchez-Graells above (n 2).
(6) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts OJ [2004] L 134/114.
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§ 1. Mandatory exclusion grounds
I. Overview
The 2014 Public Sector Directive is generally similar to the prior rules with 
respect to exclusion based on mandatory grounds, although with some new 
additions. Mandatory exclusion grounds remain those of participation in a 
criminal organisation (Art.  57(1)(a)); corruption (Art.  57(1)(b)); fraudulent 
behaviour (Art.  57(1)(c)); and money laundering, which has been supple-
mented by a reference to terrorist financing but otherwise remains unchanged 
(Art. 57(1)(e)). Two newly added grounds are those relating to convictions for 
terrorist offences (Art.  57(1)(d)) and child labour and other forms of traf-
ficking of human beings (Art. 57(1)(f)). Furthermore, a breach of tax or social 
security obligations by the economic operator, established by “final and 
binding judicial or administrative finding” is now a mandatory exclusion 
ground.7
In the 2014 Public Sector Directive, contracting authorities are required to 
exclude economic operators or persons with powers of representation, deci-
sion or control of economic operators, from participation in a procurement 
procedure when the operator has been the subject of a conviction by final 
judgment for any of the listed mandatory exclusion grounds. They are required 
to do so at any time during the procedure where it turns out that the economic 
operator is, in view of acts committed or omitted either before or during the 
procedure, in one of the situations of exclusion.8 A legislative missed oppor-
tunity is that the 2014 Directive remains silent on where this conviction by 
final judgment must have taken place: many Member States do not consider 
non-EU judgments as relevant, but Germany, Austria and the UK, for instance, 
do exclude tenderers who have been convicted outside of the EU.9
As noted above, an economic operator shall also be excluded from participa-
tion in a procurement procedure where an economic operator’s breach of its 
obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security contributions 
has been established by a judicial or administrative decision. Such as decision 
must have final and binding effect in accordance with the legal provisions of 
the country in which the economic operator is established, or with those of 
the Member State of the contracting authority.10 Exclusion on the basis of 
(7) Article 57(2).
(8) Article 57(1).
(9) H. Priess, above (n 5) 114; the UK Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 2015/102, reg. 
57(1)(n), which explicitly recognises convictions in any jurisdiction. It could be argued that there 
is an implicit geographical limit in the 2014 Directive’s reference to EU legislation in Article 57(1), 
but such an ‘implied’ condition is likely to result in different approaches by national legislators.
(10) Article 57(2).
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breaches of tax or social security obligations was, under the 2004 Directive, 
fully discretionary.11 The 2014 Directive instead indicates that where a final, 
binding administrative or judicial decision has determined a failure to pay 
taxes and social contributions, exclusion is now mandatory. The discretion to 
exclude on grounds of violations of these obligations is retained in the 2014 
Directive, but can now only apply where there is no such final, binding 
decision.
A violation of the obligation to pay taxes and social contributions, however, 
cannot be treated as a mandatory exclusion ground in two circumstances: 
first, Art. 57(2) makes clear that where the contributions and taxes have been 
paid, or an arrangement to pay these arrears has been entered into with the 
relevant national authority, exclusion is no longer possible. Art.  57(3) also 
makes explicit that an exclusion on the grounds of a failure to pay taxes and 
social contributions cannot be applied if doing so would be disproportionate. 
There are specific examples granted here – i.e., a minor amount of unpaid 
contributions, or an inability for the economic operator to settle its unpaid 
contributions because it was not told the full amount due before the procure-
ment procedure deadline – that serve to clarify, rather than distinguish, this 
particular mandatory exclusion and how it is to operate in a proportionate 
manner. While Sanchez-Graells criticizes the vagueness of the examples – in 
that what is a ‘minor amount’ is unlikely to ever be specified by the Court of 
Justice, and will thus result in disparate national legislation – it can equally be 
held that the presence of the examples will simplify these decisions for 
contracting authorities, making it very explicit that they can ‘include’ certain 
economic operators without violating (frequently very technical and unclear) 
EU law.12
As in the past Member States may provide for a derogation from the manda-
tory exclusions on an exceptional basis, for overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest. It is not clear when this derogation can be applied. Some 
scholars think this exception can be applied when there is no other economic 
operator capable of fulfilling the contract.13 This interpretation raises the 
question if, for example, the derogation can then be applied when exclusion 
leads to a substantial increase in price or a significant delay.14 Others suggest 
(11) 2004 Directive, Article 45(2)(e) and Article 45(2)(f).
(12) A. Sanchez-Graells above (n 2) 107. On the lack of clarity of EU law, see S. Arrowsmith 
above (n 2) 229.
(13) E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, G.W. van der Bend and J.F. van Nouhuys, Aanbestedingsrecht. 
Handboek van het Europese en het Nederlandse Aanbestedingsrecht (The Hague: SDU, 2009) 
269. Compare P. Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 341.
(14) S. Williams, “Coordinating public procurement to support EU objectives - a first step? The 
case of exclusions for serious criminal offences” in S. Arrowsmith and P. Kunzik (eds) Social 
and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 497; S. Arrowsmith 
above (n 2) 1281.
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this derogation should be interpreted in line with the exceptions found in the 
TFEU and the case law on free movement.15 The new Directive does not 
entirely resolve this debate, but clarifies to some extent how this provision 
should be interpreted, by stating that it relates to overriding reasons relating 
to the public interest “such as public health or protection of the environment.”16 
It is likely, therefore, that the derogation is not intended to be used on account 
of the primarily economic grounds that the first interpretation suggests as 
‘overriding reasons’.
II. Background to the new exclusion grounds
It seems that the new mandatory exclusions reflect some recent EU priorities. 
In recent years the EU has taken several measures for tougher action against 
criminals responsible for child sexual abuse and human trafficking.17 At the 
same time, fighting terrorism has remained high on the EU’s agenda since the 
adoption of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005.18 The same is true 
for money laundering and terrorist financing, where the Commission took 
several measures implementing, inter alia, recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force, an inter-governmental body that sets standards and 
promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational meas-
ures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related 
threats to the integrity of the international financial system.19
It should therefore not come as a surprise to find specific exclusions grounds 
relating to terrorist offences or offences linked to terrorist activities, money 
laundering or terrorist financing, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 2005/60/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and child labour and other 
forms of trafficking in human beings as defined in Article  2 of Directive 
2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council. However, the 
extent to which these will be relevant to procurement processes has been 
questioned by Priess, who rightly suggests that they are there to promote these 
general EU goals rather than to achieve specific procurement-related 
objectives.20
(15) S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1281.
(16) Article 57(3).
(17) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/index_en.htm (accessed 29 September 2015).
(18) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/ (accessed 29 September 
2015).
(19) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ (accessed 29 September 2015).
(20) Priess above (n 5) 115.
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§ 2. Discretionary grounds for exclusion
I. Overview
The Public Sector Directive, much like its predecessor, contains several grounds 
for exclusion based on what are called ‘discretionary grounds’. Existing 
discretionary exclusion grounds from the 2004 Directive are those relating to 
bankruptcy and insolvency (now combined in Art.  57(4)(b)), grave profes-
sional misconduct (Art.  57(4)(c)) and misrepresentation in the course of 
procurement proceedings (Art. 57(4)(h). As discussed above, in the absence of 
a final, binding decision, a violation of obligations to pay taxes and social 
contributions can still be treated as a discretionary ground for exclusion. The 
discretionary grounds for exclusion are in the 2014 Directive extended to 
cover cases relating to violations of environmental, social and labour laws 
(Art. 57(4)(a)); the distortion of competition (Art. 57(4)(d)); conflicts of inter-
ests or prior involvement (Art. 57(4)(e)); deficiencies in the performance of a 
public contract (Art. 57(4)(g)); and, finally, undue influence on the decision 
making process (Art. 57(4)(i)).
Furthermore, the new rules now make explicit that Member States may choose 
to require authorities to exclude economic operators for the reasons set out in 
the directive, making the otherwise discretionary exclusion grounds actually 
mandatory.21 As before Member States can also leave it up to the contracting 
authorities who then may decide to use those exclusion grounds for (some of) 
their tenders. However, if a discretionary ground is made mandatory, 
contracting authorities shall at any time during the procedure exclude an 
economic operator where it turns out that the economic operator is, in view 
of acts committed or omitted either before or during the procedure, in the 
situation requiring exclusion. If the exclusion ground is implemented as a 
discretionary ground, on the other hand, individual contracting authorities 
may decide at any point during a tender procedure to exclude an economic 
operator who has violated a discretionary exclusion ground – but the 
contracting authorities will not be required to do so.22
Note that if a Member State opts for implementing an exclusion ground as a 
discretionary ground, it cannot preclude a contracting authority from applying 
the ground or restrict/limit the application of the use of that ground. Moreover 
Member States are no longer able to restrict the availability of these discre-
tionary exclusion grounds to contracting authorities.23 This follows from the 
wording of the 2014 Directive. It clearly indicates that a “contracting authority 
may exclude”, effectively meaning that under the 2014 Directive, contracting 
(21) Art. 57(4).
(22) Art. 57(4).
(23) La Cascina above (n 1), para 21.
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authorities have a right to exclude an economic operator on the specified 
ground(s).24 However, this ‘right’ must be read in line with the EU’s general 
principle of proportionality, which would require the contracting authority to 
apply discretionary exclusions in a manner that is transparent and propor-
tionate. The Recitals of the Public Sector Directive confirm this, stressing that 
“minor irregularities should only in exceptional circumstances lead to the exclu-
sion of an economic operator”.25 Unfortunately, the 2014 Directive does not 
emphasize this specifically in Article 57(4), but as this is an unchanged position 
from 2004 and the principle of proportionality is now stated in Article 18(1) of 
the Directive, contracting authorities should be aware of their responsibilities.
On the other hand, where a contracting authority indicates that it will apply 
discretionary exclusion grounds in the tender documentation made available 
to economic operators, the ‘discretionary’ exclusion in principle operates as a 
‘mandatory’ exclusion. Such choices may even be ‘safer’ for contracting 
authorities to pursue: where exclusion grounds are clearly presented in tender 
documentation, contracting authorities’ behavior is far less likely to involve 
disproportionate exercises of discretion or be non-transparent. All the same, 
the factual decision-making processes regarding whether or not economic 
operators have violated one of these discretionary exclusion grounds would 
themselves need to satisfy the proportionality principle: even when clearly 
advertised in the tender documentation as an exclusion ground, then, a very 
minor violation of that ground should not result in exclusion, as was observed 
above regarding mandatory exclusions.
In general, scholars have noted that Article  57(4) is not an ideal setup for 
discretionary exclusion grounds. The fact that Member States can now choose 
to centrally apply some discretionary exclusion grounds will result in what 
Priess calls ‘regulatory fragmentation’; he correctly observes that different 
policies on which discretionary exclusion grounds are discretionary and which 
are mandatory in all 28 Member States will not ‘further the single European 
procurement market’.26 A harmonized approach to discretionary exclusion 
would have been preferable from the perspective of encouraging cross-border 
trade – but in concluding that, it must be remembered that the 2004 Directive’s 
position was to only explicitly permit contracting authority level discretion. 
Where a Member State makes a discretionary exclusion ground mandatory, 
this will be information that an economic operator will need to obtain the 
first time they enter a bid in that Member State, but thereafter, they will be 
aware; conversely, where a Member State makes a discretionary ground fully 
discretionary, this requires per-procurement investigation of the exact condi-
tions applied for exclusion, and consequently will be significantly more costly 
(24) See also S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1239.
(25) Recital 102.
(26) H. Priess above (n 5) 113; S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1239.
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and burdensome for all economic operators, including those from other 
Member States.
II. Background to the new exclusion grounds
Similar to the new mandatory exclusion grounds, the permissible or discre-
tionary grounds reflect the evolving political priorities of the EU.
A clear example is the new explicit exclusion ground for violation of obliga-
tions in the field of environmental law, social law and labour law. The increased 
focus on horizontal policy goals such as environmental and social policy goals, 
as well as a desire within the EU to firmly tackle violations in the area of 
paying social and environmental contributions/taxes, is made very explicit by 
these new rules in the 2014 Directive. Beyond this exclusion ground, the EU’s 
focus on environmental and social concerns is also made clear in Articles 18 and 
56 of the new Directive, and very firmly reiterated in recitals 2, 37 and 97:
With a view to an appropriate integration of environmental, social and 
labour requirements into public procurement procedures it is of 
particular importance that Member States and contracting authorities 
take relevant measures to ensure compliance with obligations in the 
fields of environmental, social and labour law…27
Where the contracting authority can demonstrate by any appropriate means a 
violation in the field of environmental law, social law and labour law, the 
economic operator will or can be excluded. The Directive does not define 
what ‘appropriate means’ are. Each contracting authority will therefore need 
to decide on a case-by-case basis whether any evidence it has is enough to be 
described as ‘appropriate means’. As discussed above, such determinations 
must themselves comply with the principle of proportionality; in other words, 
the decision-making process of the contracting authority must be transparent 
and reasonable.
This new exclusion ground is, in some ways, superfluous – in that existing 
exclusion grounds, such as those related to grave professional misconduct, 
would have covered the behaviour in question28; however, that only empha-
sises the extent to which the EU’s political leadership truly wished to focus on 
social and environmental issues.29
Further examples of exclusion grounds that reflect EU political priorities are 
the exclusion grounds on conflicts of interest and on undue influence on the 
(27) Recital 37.
(28) See Case C-465/11 Forposta and ABC Direct Contact sp z o.o. v Poctza Polska SA [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:801, para 27.
(29) See further P. Kunzlik, “The 2014 public procurement package – one-step forward and two 
backfor green and social procurement?”, pp. 139-196 in this collection.
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procurement decision-making process. These two exclusion grounds appear 
to have been included to emphasize the EU’s focus on the fight against corrup-
tion, which is made clear by EU involvement in the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption30 and various initiatives on the part of the OECD regarding 
conflicts of interest and corruption.31 Much like the environmental and social 
exclusion ground discussed above, the Court of Justice’s case law has already 
made clear that conflicts of interest and undue influence could form exclusion 
grounds for the sake of preserving equal treatment.32 Including them in the 
2014 Directive explicitly is thus again a firm statement on the part of the EU 
legislature that stopping corruption is a particular priority within the EU.
§ 3. Clarifications of the existing rules
As highlighted in the preceding two sections, the number of new ‘exclusion 
grounds’ introduced by the 2014 Directive is limited. However, the Directive 
furthermore (to an extent) represents an effort on the part of the EU legisla-
ture to clarify the existing exclusion grounds, and to codify Court of Justice 
case law on their application.
A first example is the exclusion ground relating to distortion of competition, 
which covers violations of both EU competition rules and national competi-
tion law. This exclusion ground confirms that breaches of competition law 
can be grounds for excluding economic operators from procurement processes. 
The 2004 Directive did not contain any specific provisions on the relationship 
between competition law and public procurement in excluding economic 
operators, but commentators have assumed that breaches of competition law 
were captured by the ‘grave professional misconduct’ exclusion ground.33 
Recent case law from the Court of Justice has confirmed that breaches of 
competition law were caught by grave professional misconduct under the 
(30) United Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly by Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003.
(31) S. Van Garsse, “Belangenconflicten vanuit een internationaal en Europees perspectief” in 
C. De Koninck (eds) Chronique des Marchés Publics 2014-2015 (Brussels: EBP, 2015) 419-428; 
also J.B.  Auby, E.  Breen and T.  Perroud (eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest. A 
Comparative Law Approach (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014).
(32) Michaniki above (n  4); Case C-538/07 Assitur v Camera di Commercio, Industria, 
Artigianato e Agricoltura di Milano [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:317.
(33) See, inter alia, S.  Arrowsmith above (n  2) 1267; A.  Brown, “The Permissibility of 
Excluding an Economic Operator From a Tendering Procedure on the Ground that it has 
Previously Committed an Infringement of Competition Law: Case C-470/13 Generali-Providencia 
Biztosító Zrt v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntobizottság” (2015) 24 PPLR NA51.
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2004 Directive34 – which suggests that this new explicit exclusion ground is 
correctly read as a specific application of that concept.35
A second example of an attempt to clarify or encode case law relates to the 
exclusion ground regarding significant or persistent deficiencies in the perfor-
mance of previous public contracts. Whether or not contracting authorities 
could exclude economic operators who had failed to perform on a previous 
public contract was an issue on which the 2004 Directive was silent, and on 
which contracting authorities wanted clarification from the Commission.36 
Before the adoption of the 2014 Directive, the Forposta judgment from the 
Court of Justice already made clear that grave professional misconduct could 
encapsulate a situation where a contracting authority had failed to perform 
on a previous public contract; however, it gave little clarity on the scope of 
‘failure to perform’ that would warrant an exclusion.37 As discussed above, 
the proportionality principle suggests that a minor failure in performance 
would not warrant an exclusion; but clarity on this was nonetheless desired 
by procuring entities throughout Europe. The 2014 Directive supplies such 
clarity, by making clear that the deficiency in contract performance has to 
have been ‘major’ – and Recital 101 provides examples of what a major defi-
ciency would look like:
…for instance failure to deliver or perform, significant shortcomings of 
the product or service delivered, making it unusable for the intended 
purpose, or misbehaviour that casts serious doubts as to the reliability 
of the economic operator…
This is a particularly welcome development, as it gives guidance to the indi-
vidual contracting authorities who will have to make decisions on exclusion 
in practice, and might consequently result in greater uniformity in application 
of the exclusion grounds throughout the EU.
A third example of clarification and codification is the exclusion ground 
relating to prior involvement, where the only means to ensure equal opportu-
nity is to exclude an economic operator who was involved in the procurement 
preparation process, or was the incumbent holder of the contract in question. 
The Fabricom case has made clear that in exceptional cases, where there is no 
other way to equalize competitive opportunity in the procurement process, 
such exclusion is permitted – and the Directive now permits this.38
(34) Case C-470/13, Generali-Providencia Biztosító v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési 
Döntőbizottság [2014] EU:C:2014:2469, para 35.
(35) See also Recital 101.
(36) Commission, Synthesis of responses to the consultation (2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_en.pdf> 
accessed 29 September 2015, p. 11.
(37) Forposta above (n 28).
(38) Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom SA v Etat belge [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:127.
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Moreover, it is submitted that general observations can be made about exclu-
sion grounds in the 2014 Directive: a number of them represent specific 
instances of what could generally be called ‘grave professional misconduct’. 
The Forposta case has defined professional misconduct as covering ‘all 
wrongful acts which have an impact on the professional credibility of the 
economic operator’.39 Such a definition would cover all violations of environ-
mental, social and labour laws, as well as misrepresentation in the course of 
procurement proceedings, in that both would negatively affect the credibility 
of the bidder in question. Similarly, the ‘undue influence’ exclusion can refer 
to instances where an economic operator attempts to bribe or coerce the 
contracting authority, which would of course also be a form of professional 
misconduct. Recital 101 of the 2014 Directive then also confirms that distor-
tion of competition is a form of ‘grave professional misconduct’, thus broad-
ening the scope of that concept even further.
It could be argued that in giving such specific examples of particular forms of 
‘grave professional misconduct’, the 2014 Directive can facilitate ease of access, 
simplicity and flexibility in the procurement process. For instance, Member 
States that want to particularly prohibit participation by economic entities 
who, for instance, attempt to bribe a contracting authority can single out that 
discretionary ground in a very clear manner; this provides certainty to economic 
operators and, if centrally legislated for, contracting authorities alike. However, 
with ‘grave professional misconduct’ still there as a distinct exclusion ground, 
the possibilities for very disparate version of this exclusion ground appearing 
in different Member States, or (worse), in different contracting authorities in 
either the same or different Member States, remain intact.40
§ 4. Self-cleaning
The final and perhaps most major innovation of the 2014 Directive is the 
inclusion of provisions on ‘self-cleaning’. The 2004 Directive did not provide a 
clear legal basis for the recognition of self-cleaning on the part of economic 
operators (so as to ‘un-exclude’ them from procurement processes). This 
resulted in significant discussion amongst academics, focusing both on whether 
and if so, to what extent, self-cleaning was a permitted defence to exclusion.41
(39) Forposta above (n 28) paras 35-37.
(40) See similarly, S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1265-1266.
(41) See, among others, H. Priess and S. Arrowsmith (eds), Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement 
Law (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009); S. Arrowsmith, H. Priess and P. Friton, “Self-
cleaning as a defence to exclusions for misconduct: an emerging concept in EC public procurement 
law?” (2009) 18 PPLR 257; H. Priess above (n 5) 121-122; contra M. Steinicke, “Qualification 
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Practices in the Member States regarding the acceptance of self-cleaning were 
very divergent. The point was clearly noted in the 2011 Green Paper on Public 
Procurement,42 explaining that the 2004 Directives failed to clarify if ‘self-
cleaning’ measures, meaning those steps taken by economic operators to 
re-qualify for procurement procedures, could be accepted. The Green Paper 
stressed that “[t]heir effectiveness depends on their acceptance by Member 
States. The issue of «self-cleaning measures» stems from the need to strike a 
balance between the implementation of the grounds for exclusion and respect 
for proportionality and equality of treatment. The consideration of self-
cleaning measures may help contracting authorities in carrying out an objec-
tive and fuller assessment of the individual situation of the candidate or 
tenderer in order to decide its exclusion from a procurement procedure.”43 
The Green Paper suggested that the 2004 Directive permitted Member States 
to accept self-cleaning measures “as far as such measures show that the 
concerns about professional honesty, solvency and reliability of the candidate 
or tenderer have been eliminated”, but noted that the lack of uniformity in 
Member State practice on the issue of self-cleaning was problematic.44
The new self-cleaning provision is applicable to both the mandatory and the 
discretionary grounds, except in the case of exclusions for non-payment of tax 
or social security contributions. Article 57(6) states that an excluded economic 
operator may provide evidence to demonstrate its reliability despite the exist-
ence of an exclusion ground. Where such evidence is deemed ‘sufficient’, the 
economic operator may be admitted to the procurement process. Self-cleaning 
measures, under Article  57(6), require an economic operator to prove that 
a) compensation for the harm rendered by the ‘wrong’ (whether criminal or 
more general misconduct) has been paid; and b) the economic operator has 
actively cooperated with any investigative authorities in order to clarify the 
facts of the transgression; and c)  appropriate ‘concrete technical, organisa-
tional and personnel measures’ have been taken to prevent repeat offences or 
misconduct.
Recital 102 offers further detail on how self-cleaning measures can be effec-
tively demonstrated; the measures in category (c), for instance, may require “the 
severance of all links or persons or organisations involved in the misbehaviour, 
appropriate staff reorganisation measures, the implementation of reporting and 
and shortlisting”, in R.  Caranta, G.  Edelstam, e.a. (eds.) EU Public Contract Law, Public 
Procurement and Beyond, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2013) 113.
(42) Commission, Green Paper on the Modernization of EU Public Procurement Policy (2011) 
COM(2011)15 final.
(43) Ibid., p. 52.
(44) Ibid. Compare: Analysis of Responses to Questionnaire issues to PPN contacts in EU 
member States the Implementation of article  45, www.publicprocurement.org (accessed 
29 September 2015).
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control systems, the creation of an internal audit structure to monitor compli-
ance and the adopting of internal liability and compensation rules”. However, 
these are merely examples of what kind of policies economic operators may 
adopt or be asked to adopt in order to self-clean; Article 57(6)’s content fully 
leaves open to the Member States (whether at central, regional, or contracting 
authority level) to establish whether or not enough ‘self-cleaning’ has taken 
place, noting only that contracting authorities will evaluate self-cleaning”taking 
into account the gravity and particular circumstances” of the misconduct.
The contracting authority (or designated authority) is obliged to evaluate the 
measures taking into account the gravity and particular circumstances of the 
criminal offence or misconduct. By way of example one can consider that for 
the relatively minor acts of crime it might be sufficient for the supplier to 
introduce codes of conduct, improved internal compliance systems, whistle-
blower channels and training for employees.45 When it comes to more serious 
offences, from which the firms have profited substantially, the self-cleaning 
initiatives might also have to (for example) involve external actors who 
monitor the firms’ internal and external operations.46 For the gravest crimes, 
one can imagine that the firm’s owners may be required to replace the whole 
management on top of other initiatives for the supplier to become sufficiently 
trustworthy for participation in public tenders.47
Where the measures are considered to be insufficient, the contracting authority 
has to supply the economic operator with a statement of the reasons for the 
decision not to accept the self-cleaning defence.
It is clear from the above that in order to re-establish its eligibility, an economic 
operator will need to take a combination of measures. First of all, as to the 
clarification of facts and circumstances the operator will have to prove that he 
has collaborated with the investigating authorities. It is suggested that the 
operator will also be required to collaborate with the contracting authorities 
in clarifying what happened, as the contracting authority is obliged to eval-
uate the measures taking into account the gravity and particular circumstances 
of the criminal offence or misconduct.48 Otherwise, the contracting authority 
will be unable to assess if the measures are appropriate and comprehensive to 
eliminate the wrongdoing in the future.
(45) E.L.  Hjelmeng and T.  Søreide, “Debarment in Public Procurement: Rationales and 
Realization” in G. M. Racca and C. Yukins (eds.) Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public 
Contracts (Brussels, Bruylant, 2014).
http://fr.bruylant.larciergroup.com/titres/130420_2/integrity-and-efficiency-in-sustainable-public-




(48) S. Arrowsmith, H. Priess and P. Friton above (n 41) 259.
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Secondly, the company will have to repair financial damage caused. Compen-
sation need not to be paid at the time of applying for self-cleaning as a defence, 
but the economic operator has to be able to demonstrate that it has under-
taken to pay compensation in the future.
Thirdly, concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures need to be 
taken that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct. 
This means (for example) dismissing executives and employees responsible for 
the infringement, installing new internal control procedures to prevent further 
or new misconducts and to ensure that wrongful acts will not occur in the 
future, or installing a monitoring service for a given period to ensure that 
compliance measures are effectively carried out.49
Last but not least, as to the scope and application of the self-cleaning defence, 
some remarks can be made. First of all, an economic operator which has been 
excluded by final judgment from participating in procurement procedures 
cannot self-clean during the period of exclusion resulting from that judgment 
in the Member States where the judgment is effective.50
Secondly, it seems that the self-cleaning exception cannot be applied in case of 
the exclusion for non-payment of tax or social security contributions. It seems 
this was done to simplify the text and because it is very easy to remedy such 
situations by simple payments.51 The general self-cleaning provisions in any 
event do not apply to non-payment of taxes and social security, as recovery 
from these is regulated in Article 57(2), setting out a need for repayment.
Thirdly, the self-cleaning defence can give rise to divergent interpretations and 
practices.52 One of the main concerns expressed by academics is the fact that 
decisions are taken by the contracting authorities which will lead to unequal 
treatment of economic operators. In fact, the same situations may be treated 
differently by different contracting authorities. The contracting authorities are 
considered by some not best placed to decide on the ‘self-cleaning’ measures. 
From the point of view of legal certainty, such divergent interpretations would 
be difficult to accept. It is true that any authority that is to judge whether the 
self-cleaning is ‘sufficient’ will have to consider a range of aspects, including 
whether the actions taken by the economic operator are sufficiently compre-
hensive and credible,53 and thus whether the efforts should lead to full 
exemption or a reduction in the debarment period, etc. Some scholars argue 
that under the current legislation and typical enforcement, there are few 
reasons to expect that these considerations will be made in an unbiased and 
(49) Compare N. Lord, Regulating Corporate Bribery in International Business: Anti-corruption 
in the UK and Germany, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2014) 125.
(50) Article 57(6).
(51) Article 57(2).
(52) S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1272.
(53) E.L. Hjelmeng and T. Søreide above (n 44) 4.
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predictable way, and the intended trust-generating effects of the exclusion 
rules are far from guaranteed.54 It is therefore suggested that Member States 
should elaborate the rules and provide guidance on them.
The Directive foresees potential problems stemming from excessive discretion 
on ‘self-cleaning’ being granted to contracting authorities, and consequently 
appears to oblige Member States to set out clear rules on how ‘self-cleaning’ 
should operate. The Directive thus requires that by law, regulation or admin-
istrative provision and having regard to Union law, Member States shall 
specify the implementing conditions for ‘self-cleaning’ measures: “Economic 
operators should have the possibility to request that compliance measures 
taken with a view to possible admission to the procurement procedure be 
examined. However, it should be left to Member States to determine the exact 
procedural and substantive conditions applicable in such cases. They should, 
in particular, be free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting 
authorities to carry out the relevant assessments or to entrust other authori-
ties on a central or decentralised level with that task.”55
In light of the potential for arbitrary decision-making where individual 
contracting authorities take decisions on the ‘sufficiency’ of self-cleaning 
measures, various authors, including Arrowsmith, consequently argue for the 




(56) S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1272.
(57) See also E.L. Hjelmeng and T. Søreide above (n 44) 6: “Despite prospective longer term 
benefits, there are many reasons for procurement officials to deviate from the debarment rules. 
The supplier supposed to be debarred may for instance deliver unique products or services of high 
quality, for instance, and might be preferred regardless of the offences committed by employees 
or a branch of its organization. The conclusion might be similar if the supplier is an important 
employer in the local community. Under other circumstances, there might be a willingness to 
debar the given supplier but difficult in practice if for instance the supplier has substantial market 
dominance and is the only one able to deliver the goods or services within a reasonable price 
frame. Undeniably, there is a risk that procurement entities will prefer more exemptions than 
what is optimal given the desired market consequences of the rules on debarment. At the local or 
institutional level, the entities are likely to focus primarily on their procurement needs given their 
budget constraints and be less concerned about how the rules work for society at large over time. 
This is not because they don’t see the trade-off between short run costs and long term benefits of 
debarment, but rather due to their mandated focus on their institutional needs; finding alternative 
suppliers may simply become too expensive or politically costly, as mentioned above. For these 
reasons, the question of whether self-cleaning is “good enough” or whether deviation from the 
mandatory debarment can be justified, should not be up to the individual procurement agency to 
decide. The procurement official should describe the need for exemption or for accepting self-
cleaning, but the decision should be made elsewhere – by a separate unit or centrally.”
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§ 5. Duration of the exclusion
One final amendment made to the 2004 rules is that the 2014 Directive does 
not permit unlimited exclusion: it requires Member States to specify maximum 
exclusion periods. A distinction is made between two situations. If the dura-
tion of exclusion for a conviction was set by a court of tribunal, that period 
of exclusion will be paramount.58 In the absence of a specified period of 
exclusion, economic operators can rely on the self-cleaning defence to demon-
strate their reliability before the exclusion period ‘runs out’, so as to shorten 
it.59 According to the 2014 Directive, exclusion should in any case end after 
no more than five years in case of mandatory grounds, starting from the time 
of conviction.60 When it comes to discretionary grounds, the maximum exclu-
sion period is three years, starting from the moment that the relevant ‘event’ 
occurred.61 Where behavior is discovered after the maximum exclusion period 
has passed, exclusion is no longer possible, and there is consequently also no 
need for economic operators to ‘self-clean’ in those instances. Member States 
are, regardless, able to shorten the ‘maximum’ exclusion periods if they wish 
to; given that the Directive sets out maximum periods of three and five years, 
exclusion periods shorter than those would by definition not be deemed 
disproportionate under EU law.
Certain aspects of Article  57(7) will need express clarification in domestic 
law: for instance, what is the ‘relevant event’ for a discretionary exclusion 
– the occurrence of the conduct, or its discovery?62 Relatedly, obtaining a final 
judgment is not an instantaneous process – the ‘event’ and the ‘judgment’ 
relating to a mandatory exclusion may be years apart, which is an issue that 
domestic law should consider. Given that the exclusion can only apply after a 
final judgment has been found, should there be a limit to the start date of an 
exclusion period?
In considering these exclusion periods, a larger issue with the flexibility 
granted to Member States in setting out discretionary exclusions becomes 
apparent. After all, prior to a final judgment, any ‘relevant event’ that testifies 
to grave professional misconduct (such as factual evidence demonstrating 
corruption or participation in a criminal enterprise) could result in a discre-
tionary three year exclusion. It may do so in certain Member States; but it will 
not in others. Given that the speed of legal proceedings in different Member 
States will also undoubtedly vary, the consequence of the flexibility inherent 
(58) Art. 57(7).
(59) Art. 57(6).
(60) Unless a court-imposed exclusion is longer; see Art. 57(7).
(61) Ibid.
(62) See also S. Arrowsmith above (n 2) 1254.
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to Article 57 may mean that economic operators in different jurisdictions may 
be subject to exclusion periods of between three years and five years, starting 
either from the date of the event or the date of a judgment, for the exact same 
behaviour.63 Not only will this complicate procurement for economic opera-
tors, but if decisions on applying discretionary exclusions are left entirely to 
contracting authorities, these authorities will have to make difficult decisions 
on how to treat similar if not identical behaviour on a case-by-case basis.
Conclusion
The 2014 Directive, in Article 57, sets out to both clarify existing grounds for 
exclusion of candidates and tenderers, and to add new ones. This article has 
demonstrated that where additions have been made to both the mandatory 
and discretionary exclusion grounds, they are a clear reflection of changing 
political priorities within the EU. Where provisions in the Directive have been 
clarified, meanwhile, this is largely in response to either explicit requests for 
clarification from contracting authorities, or as a means of codifying key 
Court of Justice case law in the field of procurement. The result, generally, is 
an Article  57 that contains more explicit and clear exclusion grounds than 
Article 45 of the 2004 Directive did. However, Article 57 introduces signifi-
cant discretion to the Member States in how they actually operate these 
clearer, more explicit exclusion grounds; the above article has thus highlighted 
that there is a risk of regulatory fragmentation in the EU, particularly where 
different Member States take different approaches to discretionary exclusion 
grounds.
Real innovation in the 2014 Directive is found in its inclusion of the possi-
bility of a ‘self-cleaning’ defence. The 2014 Directive makes clear that 
contracting authorities may accept candidates or tenderers in spite of the 
existence of an exclusion ground if they have taken appropriate measures to 
remedy the reason for exclusion. The rules on ‘self-cleaning’ are a very helpful 
clarification of whether or not accepting ‘cleaned’ tenderers is permitted under 
EU law, and they should be welcomed for that reason; however, procedurally, 
they are very open-ended, and the Member States should be encouraged to set 
out clear national rules for how an assessment of ‘self-cleaning’ is to operate.
Finally, the 2014 Directive also puts clear limits to exclusion of tenderers; 
unless a final judgment by a court requires otherwise, the maximum exclusion 
periods for violations of mandatory grounds have been capped at five years, 
and for violations of discretionary grounds have been capped at three years. 
(63) For an illustration of this issue, see ibid, 1273.
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Member States can, however, legislate so as to decrease these ‘maximum’ 
grounds, again potentially resulting in different rules in different Member 
States.
The rules in Article 57 are reflective of the general aim of the 2014 Directive 
to treat public procurement as both a genuinely economic and a governmental 
activity. The exclusion grounds themselves result in the clear non-participa-
tion of corrupt, dishonest and unreliable economic entities, but even those 
entities will not be ‘punished’ for their mistakes forever: either through self-
cleaning, or through the maximum exclusion periods, they can re-enter the 
procurement processes. This balances the desire for competitive tendering 
with the public sector goal of ‘honest spending’ in a generally appropriate 
way, providing that the Member States and contracting authorities exercise 
the discretion they have been given by the 2014 Directive with due care.
